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A. Introduction. 
This article examines the interplay between two ancient legal areas encountered in 
admiralty law, i.e. general average and piracy; the first is a unique indemnification system, 
to an extent similar to insurance,  described as providing in ancient law ‘security against a 
certain aspect of the maritime risk, namely that which consists in deliberate sacrifice for the 
common safety’1, whilst the second displays the idiosyncratic approach of admiralty law in 
providing a marine insurance definition of piracy which is to a substantial extent y at odds 
with that in public international law. The recent United Kingdom Supreme Court judgment 
in The Longchamp2 as well as other judgments on general average are examined within the 
broad context of the perennial debate as to whether or not that institution should be 
retained.  
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1 Selmer K.S., The Survival of General Average, 1958, Pitman, London 1958, p. 27 
 
2 [2018] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 1. 
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(i) General Average. 
General Average has a very long history, and Selmer describes it as ‘a venerable institution’3. 
It can be traced to Roman law and the lex rhodia de iactu, although there is no definitive 
proof of the island of Rhodes being the origin of the institution4.  The origin of the word 
‘average’ is also very interesting; the use of the word average came about a long time after 
the creation of the institution itself, and the authors of the tenth edition of Lowndes and 
Rudolf5 state that ‘there are to be found in the Constitutum Usus of the City of Pisa, a code 
dating from about A.D. 1160, some faint traces of the growth of a technical term out of the 
common Italian word avere, the having of property.’ Another possibility is that the source is 
the Arabic word ‘awar’ meaning ‘damage6’ and hence the shipping distinction between 
particular average and general average. 
For the purposes of English law, general average has been absorbed ‘from without’7 and has 
been described as an ‘equity of foreign origin, which runs somewhat against the grain of 
English commercial legislation’8. It has been stated that general average arises as a result of 
an implied contract but Brett M.R. in the Court of Appeal in Burton & Co v English & Co.9 did 
not accept this view: 
 
                                                          
 
3 Selmer K.S., The Survival of General Average, 1958, Pitman, London 1958, p. 288. 
 
4 Selmer K.S., The Survival of General Average, 1958, Pitman, London 1958, p. 20. See also Sanborn, F.R., 
Origins of the Early English Maritime and Commercial Law, Professional Books Ltd, Oxford, Reprint 1989. p. 14, 
where Goldschmidt, L., Handbuch des Handelsrechts, 3rd Edition, is cited. 
 
5 Donaldson J., Staughton C.S., Wilson, D.J., The Law of General Average and the York-Antwerp Rules, Tenth 
Edition, 1975. §12. 
 
6 See Zingarelli, N., Vocabolario della Lingua Italiana, Dodicesima Edizione, Zanichelli, 1995, p. 177 
 
7 Lowndes, R., The Law of General Average - English and Foreign, Stevens and Sons, 1873, p. v. In Pirie v Middle 
Dock Co {(1881) 4 Asp. M.C. 388], Watkin Williams J. described general average law as : 
“It is a law founded upon justice, public policy, and convenience, and rests . . . upon reasons which are so 
obvious that it is not surprising to find that it is older than any other law or rule in force . . . This principle of 
law must, in my judgment, be regarded as incorporated in and forming part of the unwritten common law of 
England.” 
 
8 Lowndes, R., The Law of General Average – English and Foreign, Stevens and Sons, London, 1873, p. v.  
 
9 1883 12 QBD 218.  
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“By what law does the right arise to general average contribution? Lord Bramwell in his 
judgment in Wright v. Marwood considers it to arise from an implied contract, but although I 
always have great doubt when I differ from Lord Bramwell, I do not think that it forms any 
part of the contract to carry, and that it does not arise from any contract at all, but from the 
old Rhodian laws, and has become incorporated into the law of England as the law of the 
ocean. It is not as a matter of contract, but in consequence of a common danger, where 
natural justice requires that all should contribute to indemnify for the loss of property which 
is sacrificed by one in order that the whole adventure may be saved.”10  
 
In Birkley v. Presgrave 11, Lawrence,. J, made the famous statement that ‘all loss which arises 
in consequence of extraordinary sacrifices made or expenses incurred for the preservation 
of the ship and cargo comes within general average, and must be borne proportionably by 
all who are interested.’ The Marine Insurance Act 190612 provides an English statutory 
definition in section 66(2) which states that ‘there is a general average act where any 
extraordinary sacrifice or expenditure is voluntarily and reasonably made or incurred in time 
of peril for the purpose of preserving the property imperilled in the common adventure.’13 
The idea behind general average as a legal norm is consistent with principles of fairness, and 
‘makes obligatory that which would have been a fair bargain if entered into beforehand’14. 
The same idea of peril to the common adventure is contained in Rule A of the York-Antwerp 
Rules 1974 which provides that ‘there is a general average act when, and only when, any 
extraordinary sacrifice or expenditure is intentionally and reasonably made or incurred for 
the common safety for the purpose of preserving from peril the property involved in a 
common maritime adventure.”15 In the recent case of The Cape Bonny16 , it was stated by 
Teare, J., that the onus of proving the reasonableness of the expenditure was on the 
shipowners claiming the general average contribution17, but ‘the owners and managers 
                                                          
10 id., at 220-221. See also The Evje (1973) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 509, per Denning M.R. at p. 513. 
 
11 1 East 220, 1801.  
 
12 6 EDW.7.c.41. 
 
13 The York-Antwerp Rules 2016 provides the following definition of general average: “Rule A 1. There is a 
general average act when, and only when, any extraordinary sacrifice or expenditure is intentionally and 
reasonably made or incurred for the common safety for the purpose of preserving from peril the property 
involved in a common maritime adventure.” 
 
14 Lowndes, R., The Law of General Average - English and Foreign, Stevens and Sons, London,1873, p. iv.  
 
15 See also York-Antwerp Rules 1994, 2004, 2016. 
 
16 [2017] EWHC 3036; [2018] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 356. 
 
17 id., paragraph 163. 
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when taking such decisions are also entitled to the benefit of the doubt if the circumstances 
are such that a prompt decision to obtain towage assistance is required.’18  
 
General average has been referred to as an early form of insurance, i.e. one where risk is 
spread between various interests all mutually protecting one another19. Selmer remarks 
that ’the justice and equity of this idea strikes one immediately’ and that ‘it is hardly 
possible to attack general average on points of principle.’20 Others have referred to general 
average as an ‘unmitigated nuisance’21. As the application of the rules on general average 
can be excessively complicated, insurers may not have the time and necessary expertise to 
check claims for indemnification of general average contributions.  
 
Although there are substantial variations in national laws relating to general average, in 
practice this part of maritime law is an area where there is widespread uniformity in its 
application as a result of the pervasive incorporation of one of the York-Antwerp Rules 
variants in carriage contracts22. As Lord Neuberger stated in the Supreme Court decision in 
The Longchamp23, ‘the Rules are not the subject of English legislation or international 
convention, and they derive legal force only through contractual incorporation’24. There 
have been various calls for the abolition of general average25, although the institution is not 
                                                          
 
18 ibid. 
 
19 See Lowndes, R., The Law of General Average, 1873, p. 313. 
 
20  Selmer K.S., The Survival of General Average, 1958, Pitman, London 1958, p. 122. 
 
21 See Buglass L.J., General Average and the York-Antwerp Rules 1974, p. 1 as cited in UNCTAD, General 
Average, A Preliminary Review, 19 January 1991 (TD/B/C.4/ISL/58), paragraph 172. 
 
22 See The York-Antwerp Rules, 1974, 1994, 2004, 2016. These Rules can be historically traced back to the 
eleven Rules contained in the York Rules of 1864. 
 
23 [2018] 1 Lloyd’s Rep.1. 
 
24 id., §3. See alo, §41, per Lord Sumption. 
 
25   Selmer K.S., The Survival of General Average, 1958, Pitman, London 1958, p. 294.  
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without supporters26 and there has been a recent call for the creation of a general average 
international convention27. There is no doubt however that general average is a cause of 
delays, and despite good intentions, the calculation of general average contributions can 
take a very long time, frequently a matter of years rather than months28.  
(b) Piracy. 
English law throws up a substantial difficulty when dealing with the requirements for a 
definition of piracy in the national private law regime of marine insurance. The international 
law requirement, now enshrined in Article 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea 198229 that pirates by definition must operate outside the jurisdiction of any 
state, is dispensed with for the purposes of the Marine Insurance Act 190630; so is the 
requirement in international law that there must be a pirate ship and a victim ship.   
In the current shipping climate, piracy is unlikely to give rise to an actual or constructive 
total loss; the requirements specified in section 57 and section 60 of the Marine Insurance 
Act 1906 will probably not be satisfied as the pirates are usually willing to release ship and 
cargo on payment of a ‘reasonable’ ransom31. When a ransom paid by one interest for the 
release of a vessel with cargo seized by pirates, the expense is a subject of general average 
                                                          
26 See Kruit J., General Average, Legal Basis and Applicable Law, 2017 Paris Legal Publishers, 262. 
 
27 id., 263.  
 
28 See Marshall, M., General Average – the figures and their relation to the debate on reform, IUMI Conference, 
Singapore, 132-16 September 2004, Legal and Liability Open Forum, 14 September 2004, p. 9. 
 
29 UNCLOS 1982, Article 101 provides:  
“Piracy consists of any of the following acts: 
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew 
or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: 
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; 
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State; 
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making 
it a pirate ship or aircraft; 
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).” 
 
30 See: Marine Insurance Act 1906, Schedule 1, Rule for the Construction of Policy number 8 which provides 
that ‘the term ‘pirates’ includes passengers who mutiny and rioters who attack the ship from ashore’. ; The 
Andreas Lemos [1982] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 483, where an unduly restrictive application in the requirement of 
violence was probably applied (Gauci, G., Piracy and its Legal Problems: With Specific Reference to the English 
Law of Marine Insurance, 2010,  Vol. 41, Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, 541)  . 
 
31 See Masefield v Amlin (The Bunga Melati Dua) [2010] EWHC 280 (Comm); (2011) Lloyd’s Rep. I.R. 338 (CA). 
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contribution by other interest/s. The legal principle is traceable to Hicks v. Palington32 which 
is used as the authority for the statement that ‘where cargo is voluntarily given up by 
pirates by way of composition, the sacrifice is a subject for contribution’33. If there is no 
room for contribution because only one interest is involved, the matter is likely to be 
treated as a ‘suing and labouring’ expense in the context of marine insurance law34. The 
latter concept is addressed in section 78 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 and a typical 
suing and laboring clause provides for the supplementary indemnification of expenses 
incurred in the taking of  reasonable measures to avert or minimise a loss covered by a peril 
insured against35. 
B. The Longchamp decision by the Supreme Court36. 
The Longchamp decision addressed the issue comprised within the so-called ‘Hudson 
conundrum’37  and clearly set forth in paragraph 1 of the Supreme Court judgment , i.e. : 
‘whether the daily vessel-operating expenses of shipowners incurred while they were 
negotiating to reduce the ransom demands of pirates should be allowed in general average 
– i.e. whether those expenses should be shared proportionately between all those whose 
property and entitlements were imperilled as a result of that seizure – or whether they must 
be borne by the shipowner alone.’ 38 In this case, the claim related to crew wages, high risk 
bonus payments, food and supplies to crews and bunkers39.  In practice, average adjusters 
had previously deemed such expenditure as not being a matter requiring a general average 
                                                          
32 (1590) Moore 297. 
 
33Donaldson, J., et al., Lowndes and Rudolf, The Law of General Average and the York-Antwerp Rules, Tenth 
Edition, Stevens and Sons, London, 1975, p. 89,paragraph 159, footnote 23. 
  
34 See Masefield v. Amlin (The Bunga Melati Dua) (2011) Lloyd’s Reports IR 338 at paragraph 64 (per Rix LJ).  
   
35 See Institute Time Clauses (Hulls) (1/10/83), Clause 13. 
 
36 The Longchamp [2017] UKSC 68, 25th October 2017; [2018] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 1.  
 
37 [2018] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 1, paragraph 18, Per Lord Neuberger PSC. 
 
38 [2018] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 1, paragraph 1, per Lord Neuberger PSC.  
 
39 [2018] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 1, paragraph 11 per Lord Neuberger PSC. 
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contribution40. It was agreed that the final negotiated-down ransom itself was allowable in 
general average41.   
 
An earlier issue about the allowability of related media expenses was no longer subject to 
contention by cargo interests42; this matter did not make it to the Supreme Court level, but 
the Court of Appeal had to make the decision on the issue of admissibility. The defendants 
were arguing that the media response was not embarked on solely or predominantly for the 
purpose of saving the common adventure. The Court of Appeal agreed with the decision of 
the court of first instance. According to Lord Justice Hamblen: 
 
“The judge found that the owners had established that the purpose of preserving the 
property from peril was one of the reasons why it engaged the media response costs 
and that that suffices. I agree. I would add that in fact that was the only reason in 
evidence. The two other possible reasons put forward by the cargo interests were 
not supported by any evidence but were assumed by the judge to be further reasons 
for the purpose of considering the argument.”43 
 
 The appeal at the Supreme Court level obviously had to address the issue of the application 
of Rule F of the 1974 York-Antwerp Rules which states that: ‘[a]ny extra expense incurred in 
place of another expense which would have been allowable as general average shall be 
deemed to be general average and so allowed without regard to the saving, if any, to other 
interests, but only up to the amount of the general average expense avoided.’ The extra 
expense amounted to $160,000 which had been incurred during the process of negotiation 
which led to a saving of $4.15 million from the initial ransom demanded by the pirates. But 
was this saving of $4.15 million another expense which would have been allowable as 
general average in terms of Rules A and C of the York-Antwerp Rules 197444? The cargo 
                                                          
40 [2018] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 1, paragraph 42, per Lord Sumption JSC.  
 
41 loc. cit., paragraph 10.  
 
42 ibid.  
 
43 [2016] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 375, at paragraph 94. 
 
44 Rule A provides: “There is a general average act when, and only when, any extraordinary sacrifice or 
expenditure is intentionally and reasonably made or incurred for the common safety for the purpose of 
preserving from peril the property involved in a common maritime adventure.” 
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owners’ argument was that paying the initial $6 million demanded by the pirates would not 
have been reasonable and therefore the saving would not have fallen within the 
requirements of Rule A on which the application of Rule F depended. The view of Lord 
Neuberger PSC for the majority45 was that ‘the reference to an “expense which would have 
been allowable” is an expense of a nature which would have been allowable”46. Lord 
Mance’s interpretation was different and was a literal application of the said provision: 
“Viewing Rule F as a whole, it is clear that the owners must show that, had they incurred the 
other expense, the costs it would have involved could validly have been treated as general 
average…”47 Both courts below had decided that the owners would have been reasonable 
‘to capitulate to the first demand’48 of the pirates. Lord Mance went on to state in 
paragraph 67 of the judgment that this action by the owners would have been 
unreasonable.  
 
Following the Supreme Court decision, it is strongly arguable that other operating costs 
including insurance premiums over the relevant period of negotiation with pirates should be 
admissible in general average.  Indeed such an insurance expense is necessary where flag or 
even coastal states, in whose waters the vessel is operating, impose a system of compulsory 
insurance. It is interesting to note that the 1994 and subsequent version of the York-
Antwerp Rules contain a Rule Paramount which states that:  
“In no case shall there be any allowance for sacrifice or expenditure unless 
reasonably made or incurred”. 
 
It is submitted that the Clause Paramount would have made no difference to the outcome 
of The Longchamp decision. More interesting is the fact that a 1994 proposal made (and 
later withdrawn) by the United States Maritime Law Association for an amendment to 
amend Rule F “whereby a substituted expense would qualify for contribution as general 
                                                          
Rule C: “Only such losses, damages or expenses which are the direct consequence of the general average act 
shall be allowed as general average...” 
 
45 Lord Mance JSC dissented. 
 
46 loc. cit., paragraph 19 (emphasis added).  
 
47 loc. cit., paragraph 55.  
 
48 loc. cit., paragraph 67.  
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average only when the expense of the alternative course of action ‘would have been 
reasonably incurred and allowable as general average’”49 If this proposal had been approved 
rather than withdrawn, it would very probably have strengthened Lord Mance’s view. It is 
the author’s view that its absence strengthens the majority decision of the Supreme Court.  
 
C. Human Life and General Average in the context of Piracy for Ransom. 
Piracy for ransom frequently involves the seizure of ship and cargo together with the crew; 
this approach seems advantageous for pirates, who benefit from the consequences of 
pressure being put on the shipowners by family members clamouring for the speedy release 
of the crew. The importance of human life has had a chequered existence in maritime 
history. There is substantial evidence in eighteenth century English court judgments where 
adjudication was requested in relation to recoverability of indemnity for a loss of a human 
cargo of slaves50. When it came to salvage, it has been the law for a very long time that 
there is no award for the sole saving of life, although the legal position would have been 
different at the time when slavery was not illegal.  
Lord Stowell in the Admiralty Court in The Aid stated that:  
“The mere preservation of life, it is true, this Court has no power of remunerating; it must 
be left to the bounty of the individuals; but if it can be connected with the preservation of 
property, whether by accident or not, then the Court can take notice of it, and it is always 
willing to join that to the animus displayed in the first instance. Here is a property of 
considerable value, which has received the assistance of four boats and twenty-two salvors. 
I think I shall act within bounds of moderation, if I allow them one-tenth of the value, and 
their expenses.”51 
This position is broadly retained in Article 9 of the Brussels Convention on Salvage 1910 and 
Article 16 of the London Salvage Convention 1989. It is notable however that this has not 
always been the case. Lowndes R. makes reference to the Merchant Shipping Act 1854 
sections 458 and 459 providing that ‘any one who has rendered assistance, when a ship is in 
                                                          
49 Cornah, R.R., Lowndes and Rudolph, The Law of General Average and the York-Antwerp Rules, 14th Edition, 
Sweet and Maxwell, paragraph F.29. 
 
50 See for instance: Gregson v. Gilbert (1783) 3 Douglas 232; 99 E.R. 629; Tatham v Hodgson (1796) 6 Term 
Reports 756; 101 E.R. 756.  
 
51(1822) 1 Hagg. 83; (1822) 166 E.R. 30.  
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distress, on the coasts of Great Britain, for saving the lives of the persons belonging to the 
ship, is entitled to a reasonable amount of salvage, whether he has also saved property or 
not.’ 52  
 
With reference to the saving of life, a similar approach to the current law of salvage has 
been taken in relation to general average. The tenth Edition of Lowndes & Rudolph –  The 
Law of General Average and The York-Antwerp Rules53 states that ‘it is accepted that the 
value of the lives saved is not brought into account.’54 The fourteenth edition of the same 
work states that ‘the lives which are preserved by the general average act are not brought in 
to contribution; by reason, it has been said, of the impossibility of assessing them at a 
pecuniary value’. 55 However, when a court ‘takes notice’ of the salvage of life and augments 
the salvage award against the cargo and shipowner, this approach in itself could be still be 
considered as a form of general average where shipowner and cargo owner are 
contributing. This point is made by in a footnote in the first edition of Lowndes where it is 
stated that ‘thus, indirectly, or rather in a disguised manner, the salvage of life was always 
really treated as general average.’56    
Piracy and the Salvage/General Average interface 
A salvage issue can arise in the context of a piratical scenario as the necessary ‘danger’ 
requirement is likely to be present; indeed, the prevention of ‘piratical looting’ has been 
listed as an example of a salvage service in a leading work on salvage law57. Where in terms 
of a salvage agreement, the master or owner of a vessel signs on behalf of the ship, cargo 
and other interests, any salvage award cannot prima facie be characterised as giving rise to 
                                                          
52 Lowndes R., The Law of General Average, 1873, at p. 84. (emphasis added) 
 
53 1975 by the Hon. Sir John Donaldson et al. 
 
54 op. cit., at §439. 
 
55 op. cit., at §17.77, where the 8th Edition of Park on Insurance is cited.  
 
56 Lowndes R., The Law of General Average, 1873, at p. 84. 
  
57 See Reeder, J. (ed.) Brice on Maritime Law of Salvage, 4th Edition, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 2003 at 
paragraph 1-342. 
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general average since all the financial interests involved in the adventure will be separately 
attached with liability unless the salvage agreement provides differently; the same principle 
can be applied to the scenario of  non-contractual salvage which can be described as a form 
of negotiorum gestio58. Reference can here be made to The Raisby59 where, after an action 
by salvors against the shipowner in respect of ship and freight, a further action was 
commenced by the said salvors against the shipowner in respect of the salvage of the cargo 
belonging to third parties; the action of the claimants failed. Sir James Hannen in the 
judgment stated that it seemed clear that ‘no primary liability rests on the ship or its owners 
to pay for the salvage of the cargo60. Furthermore reference is made in the same judgment61 
to Abbott on Shipping, where it is stated that ‘with respect to the parties liable to pay 
salvage, and the interest in respect of which it is payable, the rule is that the property 
actually benefited is alone chargeable with the salvage recovered.’ Obviously the position 
would be different if one interest had paid salvage for the benefit of two or more interests, 
and this situation may well give rise to a general average contribution. In the House of 
Lords’ decision in Anderson, Tritton & Co. v. Ocean Steamship Co. 62 (also referred to in The 
Raisby), it had been held that where, in pursuance of a binding agreement between the 
owners of the salved vessel, the shipowner had agreed to pay and had paid salvage in 
respect of both ship and cargo, the shipowner may have a claim for contribution in general 
average. However, in 1942, a legal opinion provided to the Association of Average Adjusters 
stated that ‘the interests salved are, of course, bound to discharge their several liabilities to 
the salvors on the basis of contract of salvage… i.e. on the basis of their respective values at 
the termination of the services’, but that ‘it does not follow that as between themselves 
they are not bound to adjust their rights and liabilities under the York-Antwerp Rules’63, 
                                                          
58 See Birks, P., Unjust Enrichment, 21nd Edition, Oxford University Press, p. 22. 
 
59 [1885] 10 P.D. 114. 
 
60 id., at 116. 
 
61 id., at 117. 
 
62 10 App. Cas. 107. 
  
63 The wording of this opinion is reproduced from Hudson, N.G. and Harvey, M.D. , The York Antwerp Rules, 
Fourth Edition, 2017, Informa, London, paragraph 18.45. 
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Excessive delay is evident in the practice of recalculating separate salvage awards arising 
from the same incident in terms of the rules of general average. This was avoided by a 
change the York-Antwerp Rules in 200464 and reinstated albeit with substantial 
modifications in the York-Antwerp Rules 201665. This problematic interface between general 
average and salvage is of ancient pedigree and is dealt with extensively in the first edition of 
General Average by Richard Lowndes66. The ‘expenses of a complex salvage operation: 
when property saved piecemeal’ would all constitute general average ‘if the ship is got off 
and continues her voyage’ in terms of Norwegian law, but for the purpose of English law, 
the law is not defined and the practice unsettled’67.   The 1994 York-Antwerp Rules in 
particular provide that separate elements of a salvage award calculation are to be re-
                                                          
64 YAR 2004 RULE VI. “SALVAGE REMUNERATION (a) Salvage payments, including interest thereon and legal 
fees associated with such payments, shall lie where they fall and shall not be allowed in General Average, save 
only that if one party to the salvage shall have paid all or any of the proportion of salvage (including interest 
and legal fees) due from another party (calculated on the basis of salved values and not General Average 
contributory values), the unpaid contribution to salvage due from that other party shall be credited in the 
adjustment to the party that has paid it, and debited to the party on whose behalf the payment was made…” 
 
65 YAR 2016: Rule VI – “Salvage Remuneration  
(a) Expenditure incurred by the parties to the common maritime adventure in the nature of salvage, whether 
under contract or otherwise, shall be allowed in general average provided that the salvage operations were 
carried out for the purpose of preserving from peril the property involved in the common maritime adventure 
and subject to the provisions of paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) 
 
(b) Notwithstanding (a) above, where the parties to the common maritime adventure have separate 
contractual or legal liability to salvors, salvage shall only be allowed should any of the following arise:  
(i) there is a subsequent accident or other circumstances resulting in loss or damage to property during the 
voyage that results in significant differences between salved and contributory values,  
(ii) there are significant general average sacrifices,  
(iii) salved values are manifestly incorrect and there is a significantly incorrect apportionment of salvage 
expenses,  
(iv) any of the parties to the salvage has paid a significant proportion of salvage due from another party,  
(v) a significant proportion of the parties have satisfied the salvage claim on substantially different terms, no 
regard being had to interest, currency correction or legal costs of either the salvor or the contributing 
interest…” 
 
66 London, 1873.  
 
67 loc. cit., pp. xxxii-xxxiii.  
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examined by assessors in terms of general average law68. The 1994 Rules allow for the 
admission of salvage expenses, whether under contract or otherwise, in general average69. 
The end result will be two possibly complex calculations, one in salvage based on values at 
the time and place of termination of salvage services, and one in general average based on 
values when and where the common adventure terminates70. 
D. The Effect of an Abolition of General Average; the use of Unjust 
Enrichment/Restitution71 as an Alternative Remedy. 
A UNCTAD Preliminary Report recommended ‘the setting up and organizing investigations 
and discussions between the insurance interests concerned, in order to ascertain whether 
new insurance arrangements could be brought into being which would allow the abolition 
of the existing general average system’72.  Another view which appears to be more 
mainstream is that there is still a place for general average in the modern legal system and 
that a better solution would be the simplification, rather than the abolition, of general 
average73. This approach would avoid the daunting requirement of the amendment of 
national laws worldwide74. However, the abolition of general average can be achieved 
contractually by parties to contracts of carriage in a similar way to the substantial 
achievement of uniformity through the contractual incorporation of the York-Antwerp 
Rules.  
                                                          
68 Rule VI (Salvage Remuneration) of the 1994 Rules specifically provides that: “ Expenditure incurred by 
the parties to the adventure in the nature of salvage, whether under contract or otherwise, shall be 
allowed in general average provided that the salvage operations were undertaken for the purpose of 
preserving from peril the property involved in the common maritime adventure…” 
 
69 Brice on Maritime Law of Salvage, Fourth Edition, §1-107. 
 
70 Brice on Maritime Law of Salvage, Fourth Edition, §1-107. 
 
71 As to the distinction between Unjust Enrichment and Restitution, see Birks, P., Unjust Enrichment, 2nd 
Edition, Oxford University press, p. 278 et seq. 
 
72 UNCTAD, General Average, A Preliminary Review – Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat, (TD/B/C.4/ISL/58, 19 
August 1991), paragraph 175. 
 
73 Buglass, L.J., Marine Insurance and General Average in the United States, Third Edition, 1991, Cornell 
Maritime Press,  p. 328; UNCTAD, The Place of General Average in Marine Insurance Today – Report by the 
UNCTAD Secretariat (UNCTAD/SDD/LEG/1, 8 March 1994), paragraph 172. 
 
74 ibid.  
 
14 
 
It is the author’s view that general average is a remnant of a bygone era and should be 
consigned to maritime history, even though it has been rightly suggested that general 
average can survive the widespread use of autonomous vessels75. The regime of general 
average is highly incongruous in a modern legal system; it did have a purpose, i.e. the 
spreading of risks, at the time of the Rhodian Sea Law, at the time of the Institutes of 
Justinian, the Guidon de la Mer in the sixteenth century, and the Ordinance of Rotterdam in 
the eighteenth century. With the widespread use of marine insurance contracts, general 
average has outlived its usefulness76 to the point of becoming a nuisance as an institution 
causing widespread delay. As a result, the industry has utilised the General Average 
Absorption clause (also referred to as Small General Average clauses) or a variant thereof 
for use in hull insurance contracts77. 
                                                          
75 See Van Hooydonk, E. The Law of Unmanned Merchant Shipping – an exploration, (2014) 20 JIML 403 at 422. 
 
76 See Gooding, N., General Average – Time for a Change (20th January 2004) available at  www. 
aimuedu.org/aimupapers/Gooding.pdf, accessed 18th December 2016. 
 
77 The BIMCO Standard General Average Absorption clause provides as follows: 
“1. If the Assured does not claim general average, salvage or special charges from cargo, freight, bunkers, 
containers or any property not owned by the Assured on board the vessel (hereinafter called "Property 
Interests"), the Insurers shall pay in full the general average, salvage and special charges up to ...... % of the 
insured value of the vessel or US$...., whichever is the higher. The % of the insured value of the vessel or the 
US$ sum agreed under this clause shall not be less than US$150,000.  
1.1 The Insurers shall also pay the reasonable fees and expenses of the average adjuster for calculating claims 
under this clause in addition to any payment made under 1. above.  
 1.2 If the Assured claims under this clause he shall not make any claim for general average, salvage or special 
charges against the Property Interests.  
  1.3 Claims under this clause shall be adjusted in accordance with the York-Antwerp Rules 1994, excluding the 
first paragraph of Rule XX and Rule XXI, relating to commission and interest.  
 1.4 Claims under this clause shall be payable without application of the deductible.  
  1.5 Without prejudice to any defences they may have under the terms of the policy the Insurers waive any 
defences to payment under this clause which would have been available to the Property Interests.  
  1.6 In respect of payment made under this clause the Insurers waive any rights of subrogation they may have 
against the Property Interests. This waiver shall not apply where the incident giving rise to such payment is 
attributable to fault on the part of Property Interests.  
  1.7 For claims under this clause the vessel shall be deemed to be insured for its full contributory value.” 
(retrieved from Gard, Insight, 01 May 2003).  
See further, Anon., Mega-containerships: impact on cargo underwriters, HFW Marine Insurance Bulletin, 
January 2014, pp. 5-6, in relation to a suggested new insurance policy ‘to replace the traditional approach to 
general average for large containerships’ obliging ‘the shipowner to assume cargo interests’ liability  for their 
proportion to general average/salvage guarantees’ (id., p. 6) 
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Nevertheless, whereas one can find substantial discussion about the need of abolition of 
general average in academic quarters78, it is less likely to find any such discussion in 
judgments79. Whilst cumbersome and a cause of delay, general average is intended to avoid 
an advantage for one party at the expense of another; indeed there is a strong argument 
that a general average contribution to a general average sacrifice can be justified as an 
operation of the gain-based principle that a legal remedy should be available for unjustified 
enrichment80, and that a general average sacrifice or expenditure in the event of an 
abolition of the institution of general average will be accompanied by a right to utilise a 
remedy akin to  restitution or unjust enrichment to rectify the injustice occasioned, 
although, given the infancy of the development of this area in the English law of obligations, 
the application of this regime to shipping law may constitute an uphill struggle81. It has been 
stated that general average itself can be viewed as part of the law of restitution82, and it can 
be viewed also possibly as falling within the terms of compensability as negotiorum gestio83  
which in Roman law arose quasi ex contractu84; others have viewed general average as sui 
                                                          
78 See, in particular: Selmer K.S., The Survival of General Average, Pitman, 1958;  Mukherjee, P.K., The 
Anachronism in Maritime Law that is General Average, WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs, 2005, Vol. 4, No. 2, 
195-209. 
 
79 Lowndes does mention ‘a certain repugnance’ of a minority of judges when it comes to the development ‘of 
this equity of foreign origin’. Lowndes, R., The Law of General Average, 1873, p. v. 
 
80 See Birks, P., Unjust Enrichment, 2nd Edition, Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 3 where it is stated that ‘even 
at the beginning of the 21st century unjust enrichment is still unfamiliar to most common lawyers’.  
 
81 See, The Kos (2012) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 292, where, in relation to the use of unjustified enrichment as a cause of 
action to enable a shipowner to recover expenses incurred after the withdrawal of the vessel from a time 
charterer, Lord Sumption stated :  “ It may well be that in the light of recent developments in this area of law, 
the owners might be entitled to succeed on this basis also, although the measure of recovery would not 
necessarily be the same. This, however, raises larger issues which would be better decided in a case where 
they arise, and possibly in a less specialised context than a dispute about carriage by sea.” (paragraph 31).  
 
82 F.D. Rose, General Average as Restitution (1997) 113 L.Q.R. 569-574. 
 
83 See Hunter W.A., A Systematic and Historical Exposition of Roman Law, Fourth Edition, Sweet and Maxwell, 
MDCCCIII, 661 et seq., where the negotiorum gestor is described as ‘one who has done something for another 
without being asked’. See, further, id., at 616, where it is stated that the action de in rem verso is the 
equivalent of the action negotiorum gestorum.  
 
84 id., at 655. 
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generis85. If general average is considered as part of the law of restitution/unjust 
enrichment, there is no reason why similar principles should not be extended to non-marine 
transportation law. Similarly the remedy of unjust enrichment/restitution or negotiorum 
gestio could be developed to perform all the functions of general average law in the event 
of the latter’s abolition. Although still in its infancy, English law of unjustified 
enrichment/restitution has moved on from the earlier situation described by Bowen LJ by 
the following well-known statement: 
“I am of the same opinion. The general principle is, beyond all question, that work 
and labour done or money expended by one man to preserve or benefit the property 
of another do not according to English law create any lien upon the property saved 
or benefited, nor, even if standing alone, create any obligation to repay the 
expenditure. Liabilities are not to be forced upon people behind their backs any 
more than you can confer a benefit upon a man against his will. 
There is an exception to this proposition in the maritime law. I mention it because 
the word “salvage” has been used from time to time throughout the argument, and 
some analogy is sought to be established between salvage and the right claimed by 
the Respondents. With regard to salvage, general average, and contribution, the 
maritime law differs from the common law. That has been so from the time of the 
Roman law downwards. The maritime law, for the purposes of public policy and for 
the advantage of trade, imposes in these cases a liability upon the thing saved, a 
liability which is a special consequence arising out of the character of mercantile 
enterprises, the nature of sea perils, and the fact that the thing saved was saved 
under great stress and exceptional circumstances. No similar doctrine applies to 
things lost upon land, nor to anything except ships or goods in peril at sea.”86 
 
It is now the case that the exceptions may now have ‘overwhelmed the supposed rule’. 87 
An argument in favour of general average has been that the abolition of general average 
would result in one party, e.g. cargo owner unjustly enriching itself at the expense of others, 
e.g. the cargo owner88. This could arguably be the case where a shipowner incurs damage to 
machinery in an endeavour to refloat cargo carrying vessel for the common safety. An 
avoidance of both general average and the law of unjustified enrichment/restitution can be 
                                                          
85 See: Hain v. Tate & Lyle (1936) 41 Com. Cas. 350 at 372.   
 
86 Falcke v Scottish Imperial Insurance Co. (1886) 34 Ch D 234, 248. 
 
87 Birks, P., Unjust Enrichment, Oxford University Press, 2nd Edition, at p. 23. 
 
88 See Kruit, J., General Average, Legal Basis and Applicable Law, Paris Legal Publishers 2017, §6.5.3.2.2. 
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achieved by making the carrier absolutely responsible for the carriage of the goods and 
without recourse to claims in general average or an equivalent remedy. Such an initiative 
would necessitate also the amendment of current regimes of carriage of goods by sea 
embodied in the Hague, Hague-Visby, Hamburg and Rotterdam Rules. Another solution is 
that recommended by Selmer89, i.e.: 
‘to leave it to each single party to insure his own disbursements as well as his 
physical losses... This would require some innovations in marine insurance, but the 
difficulties would hardly be insurmountable.”  
 
 
G. General Average and Marine Insurance.  
An abolition of general average could have a substantial impact on marine insurance. 
Marine insurance law treats general average as one of three types of saving acts, the other 
two being salvage expenses and suing and laboring expenses90. The interface between the 
three institutions can be problematic, and there is certainly overlap, or at least potential 
thereof, between general average and salvage; this is in part a result of the use of the 
wording in section 65(2) restricting salvage charges to meaning ‘the charges recoverable 
under maritime law by a salvor independently of contract’91 . The abolition of general 
average would involve the potential, at least, of avoidance of such duplication. The abolition 
of general average could have potentially more serious implications for the insurer if some 
general average expenses, e.g. payment of a ransom to pirates,  could end up being treated 
as a sue and labour expense, consequent upon an appropriate amendment to section 78(2) 
of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 which at present provides that ‘general average losses 
and contributions and salvage charges, as defined by this Act, are not recoverable under the 
                                                          
89op. cit., pp. 292-3. 
 
90 See sections 65, 66 and 78 of the Marine Insurance Act 1906. 
 
91 Emphasis added. See different approaches at Lambeth R.J., Templeman on Marine Insurance , Sixth Edition, 
p. 371, and Rose, F., Marine Insurance, Law and Practice, 2nd Edition, 2012, §20.16. A solution would be an 
interpretation taking into account that ‘independently of contract’ in section 65(2) of the Marine Insurance Act 
1906 is a reference to requirement of voluntariness under the general law of salvage, in the sense that the 
Marine Insurance Act 1906 is excluding from the definition of ‘salvage charges’ the services rendered by ‘the 
assured or their agents’ in terms of the next sentence within section 65(2). In terms of the general law of 
salvage members of crew can only claim salvage when the ship has been properly abandoned and they return 
to save the ship in circumstances similar to those in The San Demetrio (1941) 69 LL. L. Rep. 5.  
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suing and labouring clause’. Whereas  general average expenses are treated as subject to 
the limits of the main part of the policy, the suing and laboring clause is ‘supplementary to 
the contract of insurance’92 and an insured could be better off with a suing and labour-type 
remedy where the claim for minimisation expenses is accompanied by a claim for a total 
loss. This is an advantage currently available for a claimant under the suing and labouring 
clause as distinct from claiming under a marine insurance contract for an indemnity relating 
to a contribution in general average. 
 
 
 
 
H. General Average and Negligence. 
A general average situation in the context of piracy may well be preceded and to an extent 
or other caused by shipowner’s negligence; an example may be in that of a ship carrying 
high value cargo which is sent to sea in an unseaworthy state in that it is not sufficiently 
equipped to encounter a foreseeable piracy threat, for instance without crew which has 
been adequately trained in anti-piracy procedures.  
 
There is a view that the abolition of general average will remove a cheat’s charter in that it 
has been a well-known ‘secret’ in seafaring communities that some unscrupulous 
shipowners abuse the general average system to claim contributions for repairs potentially 
traceable to initial unseaworthiness and negligence93. General average has been described 
as a ‘nest of fraud and abuses, a lurking place for peculation and waste’94. The legal position 
of unscrupulous shipowners is, at least to an extent,  aided by the wording of Rule D of the 
York-Antwerp Rules, which was originally adopted in Antwerp in 1903 and states in the 2016 
                                                          
92 Marine Insurance Act 1906, section 78(1).  
 
93 See also Gooding, N., General Average – Time for a Change, General Average Presentation, IUMI Conference, 
1996, who states in his concluding paragraph, that ‘[g]eneral Average in the modern world only benefits the 
poor quality shipowner’.  
 
94 See Gooding, N., General Average – Time for a Change (20th January 2004) available at www. 
aimuedu.org/aimupapers/Gooding.pdf, accessed 18th December 2016, where this statement is attributed to a 
Mr Joseph Hillman, in a letter published in the Times of London on the 24th of December 1877. 
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version:  “Rights to contribution in general average shall not be affected, though the event 
which gave rise to the sacrifice or expenditure may have been due to the fault of one of the 
parties to the common maritime adventure, but this shall not prejudice any remedies or 
defences which may be open against or to that party in respect of such fault.” This provision 
effectively leads to the conclusion that every sacrifice or expenditure even if caused by the 
fault of one of the parties to the adventure, including the shipowner, can give rise to a claim 
for a general average contribution, relegating the issue of liability for breach of contract to 
the settlement stage95. Teare, J., in The Cape Bonny,96  stated that ‘[t]he object of Rule D is 
to keep all questions of alleged fault out of the adjustment and to preserve unimpaired the 
legal position at the stage of enforcement.’ Paragraph D gives the benefit of the doubt to 
the shipowner who thence gets the benefit of a possessory lien enforceable against the 
consignee of cargo97  with all attendant legal benefits. Cosco Bulk Carrier v Tianjin98 is a 
recent case where cargo insurers were claiming unseaworthiness as a defence to a claim 
under a general average guarantee; it was held that the pleaded defence was one without 
foundation. However the specific details of the judgment would not indicate that this 
judgment can be used to back up the view that negligence or unseaworthiness are difficult 
to use as a defence. Furthermore, in the recent case of The Cape Bonny99 , a claim for 
general average contribution by the shipowners against guarantors on behalf of cargo 
interest failed on the grounds that ‘the general average incurred by the Owners was due to 
an actionable fault’100. The actionable fault in this case was a failure to exercise the due 
diligence requirement to make the vessel seaworthy and the claims for general average 
contribution were not successful. 
 
                                                          
95 See Selmer K.S., The Survival of General Average, 1958, Pitman, London 1958,  pp. 82-83. 
 
96 2017] EWHC 3036 (Comm) 4th December 2017, paragraph 4. 
 
97 See Castle Insurance v. Hong Kong Island Shipping (1984) AC 226 (HL). 
 
98 [2017] EWHC 2509 (Comm) 27th July 2017; (2018) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 396. 
 
99 [2017] EWHC 3036 (Comm) 4th December 2017; (2018) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 356. 
 
100 id., at paragraph 155. 
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It is of interest to note that some national legal systems have historically not applied this 
rule, i.e. the equivalent of Rule D. The first edition of Lowndes’ General Average101, in 
answer to the question ‘Can there be general average when the danger has resulted from 
unseaworthiness, or fault of the master, or vice propre of the cargo?’ lists a number of legal 
systems where the answer is a clear ‘no’: the Dutch, the Portuguese and the Italian. On the 
other hand, in such cases, the German and Swedish systems would have allowed general 
average as between the parties not at fault102.  
 
 
 
H. Conclusion 
Piracy and general average have both been around for an extremely long time. This paper 
leads to the probably inevitable suggestion that, for the sake of avoidance of confusion, in 
those legal systems where there is a discrepancy the definition of piracy for national marine 
insurance law purposes should correspond to that in international law.   Secondly it is 
proposed that states should embark upon the task of exploring the possible procedure for 
the abolition of the law of general average from their national commercial or maritime 
legislation; this task should however take into account the possible implications of leaving 
the door ajar to permit a similar remedy under another name, i.e. unjust enrichment.  
 
                                                          
101 Lowndes, R., The Law of General Average (English & Foreign) Stevens and Sons, London, 1873, xxviii. 
 
102 loc. cit., pp. xxviii-xxix. 
 
